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A b s t r a c t  The ever-changing environment in which ports operate has put strong 
pressure on the role of port authorities. The evolution of port governance has so far mainly 
been analysed in qualitative terms, through expert knowledge and case studies. This article 
fills a research gap in providing a quantitative analysis of port governance in Europe, using 
data from a major survey, which the European Sea Ports Organisation carried out in 2010 to 
prepare a new edition of its ‘Fact-Finding Report’. These reports have been monitoring port 
governance diversity since the 1970s. The 2010 survey was based on a new  conceptual 
background, which takes into account the evolution of ports, as well as new perspectives 
on the role of port authorities. This article provides a quantitative assessm ent of the survey 
results, identifying elements that may explain the governance diversity of European sea­
ports. This is done with the help of factor analysis. The results confirm the existence of 
different types of port governance models in Europe, which to some extent correspond to 
the hypothetical typology according to which port authorities can be conservators, facil­
itators or entrepreneurs. Differences are mainly geographically defined and the subdivision 
in Hanseatic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and new Member State port authorities proves to be a 
valuable one. In addition to this geographical explanation of diversity, the analysis also 
detects different governance practices betw een small and large ports.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is a well-known fact that ports in  Europe are diverse. Governance is one of the 
key elements that determ ine this diversity. W hen using the term  ‘port govern­
ance’, we can distinguish two levels: the governance of the port and the govern­
ance of the port authority. The form er corresponds to the wide cluster of 
economic, societal and public policy stakeholders that relate to a port, whereas 
the latter concerns the internal firm level or ‘corporate governance’ of the port 
authority (Brooks and Cullinane, 2007; De Langen, 2007). The term ‘port authority’ 
implies a specific, that is, public, form of port m anagem ent, but we use it here 
as the generic term  for the body w ith statutory responsibilities that manages 
a p o rt’s w ater and  land-side dom ain, regardless of its ow nership or legal form 
(De Monie, 2004).
Port governance is a broad concept, w hich encom passes several dim en­
sions. Seven distinct groups of param eters can be used w hen analysing gov­
ernance practices: (i) devolution, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) operational 
profile, (iv) functional autonomy, (v) functional pro-activeness, (vi) investm ent 
responsibility and (vii) financial autonomy. Furtherm ore, governance practices 
are not stable in  time and space. W hile in  the past cargo-handling in European 
ports was traditionally carried out by locally based companies, horizontal and 
vertical integration of cargo-handling companies have resulted in a m arket 
dom inated by global players. This evolution attracted the attention of both 
policymakers and researchers w hich often refer to the declining influence of 
port authorities, while global players gained bargaining pow er (Heaver et al, 
2000; Heaver et al, 2001; Slack and Frémont, 2005; Olivier and Slack, 2006; 
Jacobs and Haii, 2007; Vanelslander, 2011). As a response to this evolution, 
several port authorities reposition them selves by adopting pro-active strategies 
and developing activities in other nodes in  the logistic chain, outside the own 
port perimeter. In addition to the changes in port governance over time, dif­
ferences across space exist. Suykens (1988; Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998) 
identified three m ajor port governance traditions in Europe: the ‘H anseatic’ 
tradition of local, m ostly m unicipal, governance, w hich is dom inant in  ports 
around the Baltic and North Sea; the ‘Latin’ tradition of central governance, 
w hich reigns in France and countries around the M editerranean; and finally, the 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ tradition of independent governance, which is characteristic of 
ports in  the United Kingdom and Ireland. Finally, governance practices may 
differ for other organisational reasons such as the size of the port and the port 
authority (for example, num ber of employees).
Despite the extensive literature on port governance (for an  overview see, for 
example, Verhoeven, 2010 and Pallis et al, 2010), studies generally describe 
general trends or limit them selves to case studies. To our knowledge, there
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exists no study w hich analyses port governance practices of a large num ber of 
ports in  a systematic way. In the present article, we analyse port governance in 
Europe, using a rich database containing variables that cover all aforem en­
tioned dim ensions of port governance. This inform ation was collected by the 
European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO). This organisation, which represents 
the com m on interests of European port authorities, and its predecessor, the 
Community Port Working Group, have been m onitoring the diversity in port 
(authority) governance in  Europe since the 1970s through a series of ‘Fact- 
Finding Reports’. Throughout this period, the environm ent in  w hich ports 
operate has changed dramatically, putting strong and m ultiple pressures on the 
role of port authorities. The Fact-Finding Reports were m ainly descriptive in 
nature and did not allow a profound quantitative analysis. In 2010, ESPO pre­
pared a new  edition of the report through a m ajor survey am ong European port 
authorities. The survey was based on a new conceptual background that takes 
into account the evolution of ports, as well as new perspectives on the role of 
port authorities. Concretely, the survey enquired about the objectives and 
functions of port authorities, com pared institutional frameworks, and analysed 
financial capabilities. This exercise yielded a rich database of observations and 
variables, suitable for in-depth quantitative analysis.
In this article, we do not describe the actual findings of the survey, these can be 
found in the Fact-Finding Report itself (Verhoeven, 2011). We focus instead on a 
quantitative assessment of the principal elements that may explain the governance 
diversity of European seaports. This is done with the help of factor analysis, a 
commonly applied tool to explore data sets with many variables, which are then 
summarised into a limited num ber of unobserved factors.
The first two sections of the article introduce the conceptual background of 
the survey and the survey data. In the following sections, we describe the 
research methodology for the quantitative assessm ent and present the results of 
the factor analysis. A concluding section discusses the m ain findings and sets 
out issues that require further research.
C o n c e p t u a l  B a c k g r o u n d
The 2010 edition of the ESPO Fact-Finding Report builds on the tradition of the 
original reports, but it is based on a new conceptual background. This was 
developed by Verhoeven (2010), taking into account the evolution of the port 
concept, as well as new perspectives on the role of port authorities. The latter 
are based on an extensive literature review, which revealed that, in recent times, 
a renewed interest in the role of port authorities has emerged. This role has 
come under severe and multiple pressures from stakeholders following important
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socio-economic changes in  the port landscape. Scholars have issued various 
recommendations for a ‘renaissance’ of port authorities, revisiting the traditional 
landlord, regulator and operator functions, and devising a community manager 
function that is intrinsically linked to the changing nature of port communities and 
stakeholders. In addition, scholars have also identified the scope of port authorities 
as one that ought to extend their activities beyond the local port perimeter, at 
regional or even at global level. Combining the functional profile and the geo­
graphical dimension in a matrix allows one to elaborate on the existential options 
of port authorities in a hypothetical typology consisting of three basic types: the 
‘conservator’, the ‘facilitator’ and the ‘entrepreneur’. The basic features of each 
type are illustrated in Table 1.
A ‘conservator’ port authority concentrates on being a good housekeeper 
and essentially sticks to a rather passive and m echanistic im plem entation of the 
three traditional port authority functions at local level. Because of this low-profile 
attitude, conservator port authorities may run  the highest risk of becoming 
extinct in the future. A ‘facilitator’ port authority profiles itself as a m ediator 
and m atchm aker betw een economic and societal interests, hence the well-de­
veloped com m unity m anager function. Facilitator port authorities also look 
beyond the port perim eter and try to engage in strategic regional partnerships. It 
is the type of port authority, which so far seems to find most support in literature. 
The ‘entrepreneur’ port authority combines the m ain features of the facilitator 
w ith a more outspoken commercial attitude as investor, service provider and 
consultant on all three geographical levels (local, regional and global). Because 
of this am bitious profile, it is also the type that runs the highest risk of running 
into problems caused by conflicts betw een the various functional levels.
The conceptual fram ework is completed w ith the exploration of a num ber 
of governance-related elements that m ay influence the extent to w hich a port 
authority will be a mere conservator or will be able to take on facilitating and 
entrepreneurial responsibilities. Four essential elements can be identified: two 
formal and two informal ones. The two formal elements consist of the legal and 
statutory fram ework on the one hand and the financial capability (that is, 
financial autonom y and investm ent responsibility) on the other. The informal 
elements relate to the balance of pow er w ith governm ent and the m anagem ent 
culture that reigns w ithin the port authority. It should be noted that these four 
elements are strongly interrelated. The pow er balance w ith governm ent will 
influence the legal and statutory framework, whereas the financial capability of 
the port authority will determ ine the room  its m anagem ent has to m ake pro­
active and intelligent use of port governance tools w ithin a given structural 
framework.
In the Introduction, we presented seven distinct governance dimensions:
(i) devolution, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) operational profile, (iv) functional
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Table 1: H y p o th e t ic a l ty p o lo g y  o f  p o r t  a u th o r i t ie s
Type
Functional
dimension
Conservator Facilita tor Entrepreneur
Landlord Passive rea l e s ta te  'm an ag e r ':
•  c o n tin u ity  an d  m a in te n a n c e
•  d e v e lo p m en t m ain ly  le f t  to  o th e rs  
(g o v e rn m e n t/p r iv a te  sec to r)
•  f in a n c ia l rev en u e  from  rea l e s ta te  
on ' t a r i f f  basis
A ctive rea l e s ta te  'b ro k e f :
•  c o n tin u ity , m a in te n a n c e  and  
im p ro v em en t
•  d e v e lo p m en t broker and  co -in v es to r
•  in c lu d es  u rban  and  e n v iro n m e n ta l rea l 
e s ta te  b rokerage
•  f in a n c ia l rev en u e  from  rea l e s ta te  on 
com m ercia l basis
M edia to r in com m ercia l B2B re la tio n s  
b e tw e en  se rv ice  p rov iders an d  p o rt 
cu stom ers
S tra te g ic  p a r tn e rsh ip s  w ith  in lan d  p o rts , dry 
p o rts  an d  o th e r  seap o rts
A ctive rea l e s ta te  'd ev e lo p e ri:
•  co n tin u ity , m a in te n a n c e  and  
im p ro v em en t
•  d ire c t in v e sto r
•  in c lu d es  u rban  and  en v iro n m e n ta l 
rea l e s ta te  d ev e lo p m en t
•  f in a n c ia l rev en u e  from  rea l e s ta te  
on com m ercia l basis
•  f in a n c ia l rev en u e  from  n o n -co re  
a c tiv i tie s
D irect com m ercia l B2B n e g o tia t io n s  w ith
p o rt cu sto m ers  -  a c tiv e  p u rsu it o f  m arket
n iches
D irect in v e s tm e n ts  in in lan d  p o rts , dry
p o rts  an d  o th e r  seap o rts
R egu la to r Passive ap p lic a tio n  and  en fo rc e m e n t o f rules 
and  reg u la tio n s  m ain ly  s e t  by o th e r  
ag e n c ie s
F inanc ia l rev en u e  from  re g u la to r  ro le  on 
' t a r i f f  basis
A ctive ap p lic a tio n  and  en fo rc e m e n t o f ru les and 
reg u la tio n s  th ro u g h  co -o p e ra tio n  w ith  local, 
reg io n a l and  n a t io n a l reg u la to ry  a g e n c ie s  +  
s e t t in g  o f own ru les an d  reg u la tio n s  
Provide a s s is ta n c e  to  p o rt com m un ity  to  
com ply  w ith  ru les and  re g u la tio n s  
F inanc ia l rev en u e  from  reg u la to r  ro le on 
' t a r i f f  bas is  w ith  d if fe re n tia l charg ing  
o p tio n s  fo r su s ta in a b ili ty
Idem  fa c i li ta to r  +  se llin g  ex p e rtis e  and  to o ls  
o u ts id e  th e  p o rt
F inanc ia l revenue  from  re g u la to r  ro le  on 
com m ercia l basis
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O perato r M echan is tic  ap p lic a tio n  o f concess ion  policy 
(lic en se - is su in g  w indow )
Com m unity
m anager
Not ac tiv e ly  deve loped
Geographical Local 
dimension
Source: V erhoeven (2 0 1 0 ).
Dynam ic use o f concess ion  policy, in
co m b in a tio n  w ith  rea l e s ta te  broker role 
'L eader in d is s a tis fa c tio n ' as  regards 
perfo rm ance o f p riv a te  p o rt serv ices 
providers
Provide serv ices o f  g en e ra l econom ic  
in te re s t  and  sp ec ia lised  com m ercia l serv ices
Econom ic d im ension :
•  so lve  h in te r la n d  b o ttle n e c k s
•  p rov ide tra in in g  and  e d u c a tio n
•  p rov ide IT serv ices
•  p rom o tion  an d  m arketing
•  lobbying  
S o c ie ta l d im ension :
•  acco m m o d a te  co n flic tin g  in te re s ts
•  lobbying
•  p ro m o te  p o s itiv e  e x te rn a litie s
Dynam ic use o f co n cess io n  policy, in
co m b in a tio n  w ith  rea l e s ta te  d ev e lo p m en t 
ro le
S h a reh o ld e r in  p r iv a te  p o rt serv ice  
prov iders
Provide serv ices  o f g en e ra l econom ic  
in te r e s t  and  com m ercia l serv ices 
Provide serv ices  in  o th e r  po rts  
Idem  fa c i li ta to r  ty p e  b u t eco n o m ic  d im ension  
w ith  m ore d ire c t com m ercia l in v o lv em en t
Local +  Regional Local +  Regional +  Global
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autonomy, (y) functional pro-activeness, (vi) investm ent responsibility and
(vii) financial autonomy. The m eaning of these dim ensions is explained below.
(i) The term  ‘devolution’ is used here in  the broad sense, to identify to which 
extent port m anagem ent has been privatised, decentralised an d /o r 
corporatised.
(ii) There is a difference between being corporatised in form and actually 
following principles of corporate governance that are customary in private 
undertakings. On the basis of the survey, the latter can be assessed from 
various perspectives, including the economic and non-economic objectives 
port authorities have, their organisational structure (including the appoint­
m ent of top management executives and the composition of supervisory 
bodies), transparency through the use of public selection procedures to 
contract out land to port operators, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
policies and the use of corporate accounting principles.
(iii) The custom ary way to classify port authorities in operational term s is to 
distinguish between ‘landlord ports’, ‘tool ports’ and ‘service ports’, depending 
on whether, respectively, port authorities are not involved in (cargo-handling) 
operations at all, operate superstructure and related services or provide full 
operations in  an  integrated manner.
(iv) Functional autonom y is analysed from the perspective of the landlord and 
regulator function. The landlord function can be considered as the 
principal function of contem porary port authorities. Im portant issues here 
are land ownership, as well as the ability and autonom y in contracting land 
out to third parties. The regulator function is to a large extent perform ed by 
the harbour m aster’s office, w hich can be an  integral part of the port 
authority structure or a separate entity.
(v) Functional pro-activeness can be assessed at the level of the port authority’s 
own port(s) and beyond. The ‘own port’ dimension covers pro-active 
fulfilment of the traditional landlord and regulatory functions, as well as the 
community manager one, which is pro-active by nature. The ‘external’ 
dimension looks at how port authorities transpose their functions beyond 
their own borders, including investment in hinterland networks, investment in 
other ports, export of regulatory and other expertise and so on.
(vi) Investment responsibility concerns financial responsibility for the capital 
investment, administration, operation and maintenance of the capital assets 
that constitute a port, including maritime access, terminal-related infrastruc­
ture, transport infrastructure within the port area and transport infrastructure 
outside the port area. Also, sources of port authorities’ operating income are 
covered here, such as general port dues, land lease, services and public 
funding.
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(vii) Financial autonomy concerns first of all the legal nature, calculation basis and 
autonomy that apply to different categories of port authority income charges, 
in particular general port dues. Financial autonomy of port authorities is also 
analysed in terms of decision making regarding new investments in capital 
assets, setting of wages, terms and service conditions of its own personnel and 
the requirement to meet certain financial targets.
Th e  ESPO F a c t - F i n d i n g  S u r v e y
Survey design
The 2010 Fact-Finding Report of ESPO is the first to be based on a Web-based survey 
that was addressed directly to individual port authorities in Europe, rather than to 
national port organisations, as was the case with previous editions. National port 
organisations were, however, instrumental in encouraging their members to 
respond to the survey. The survey comprised 108 questions. Apart from a general 
section profiling the port(s) controlled by the port authority, it consisted of three 
main sections that were based on the conceptual framework described above: the 
first enquired about the objectives and functions of the port authority (landlord, 
regulator, operator, community manager); the second looked into the institutional 
framework of the port authority (ownership, legal status and form, organisational 
structure); and the final set of questions addressed the financial capability of the 
port authority (financial responsibility, financial autonomy).
Response rate
The survey was m ade available to all port authorities in  the 22 maritime 
M ember States of the European Union and port authorities in  four neighbouring 
countries that are represented in ESPO: Iceland, Norway, Croatia and Israel. The 
survey was online from 1 April to 15 July 2010. One hundred and sixteen port 
authorities from the 26 countries represented in  ESPO responded. Together, 
these 116 port authorities reported that they m anage a total of 216 different 
ports. The total freight volume handled by these ports in  2008 am ounted to 
2 770 803.000 tonnes (Eurostat data completed w ith national statistics for 
Iceland and Israel).
Figure 1 illustrates the response rate per country, expressed in percentage of 
the total volum e of cargo handled by all ports in  each country.
The bottom  line of the figure shows that the total sample of ports that 
responded to the survey handles 66.2 per cent of the volum e of cargo handled
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Figure 1: S urvey re sp o n se  ra te s , e x p re ssed  in  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  th e  t o t a l  v o lum e o f  ca rg o  h an d led .
by the total European population  of ports in  2008. The response rate was very 
high (75-100 per cent) in  Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Israel, 
Latvia, Lithuania, M alta, the N etherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rom ania and 
Slovenia; it was m edium  to high (50-74 per cent) in France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom; it was low to m edium  (25-49 per cent) in 
D enm ark, Finland and Sweden. The response rates of Greece and Norway
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were very low (less than  25 per cent). It should be noted that in  countries with 
lower response rates the ports that replied do form a representative sample of 
the governance diversity that exists in these countries.
R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y
The research m ethodology we used to assess the survey results consists of two 
m ain steps. The first concerns the selection and clean-up of the data generated 
by the survey, whereas the second consists of the use of factor analysis, as data 
reduction technique, to help revealing the underlying factors that may explain 
port governance diversity in Europe. As an interm ediate step, we introduced a 
series of dum m y variables to test the hypothesis that regional characteristics 
m ay constitute an im portant factor that explains port governance diversity in 
Europe.
Survey data and selection of variables
As m entioned above, the Fact-Finding Survey contained 108 questions. These 
questions generated 269 individual variables. Most of these variables are of 
nom inal, that is, categorical nature, containing several answ er categories. First, 
we m ade a selection of variables to m ake the data set more m anageable and, 
notably, to obtain a w orkable ratio betw een the num ber of variables and the 
num ber of observations. Factor analysis requires that there are more observa­
tions than  variables. Variables that generated no or only few observations were 
deleted and the m ost pertinent variables were selected from different questions 
that were addressing similar issues. In addition, some variables were clustered 
into new ones.
This resulted in a data set of 67 variables classified according to the 
them atic groups that we described in the previous section: devolution, corpo­
rate governance, operational profile, functional autonomy, functional p ro­
activeness w ithin the port authority’s own port(s), functional pro-activeness 
beyond the port authority’s ow n port(s), investm ent and financial autonomy. In 
addition, a ‘size’ group was created, w hich includes variables related to the 
volumes of total cargo, containers and passengers handled in the port(s) 
m anaged by the port authority, as well as the num ber of staff the port authority 
employs (SZ_CARGO, SZ_CONTR, SZ_PASSG, SZ_STAFF).
The ‘devolution’ (DV) variables m easure to w hat extent responsibility for 
port m anagem ent is transferred from central governm ent, through privatisation 
(DV_PRIVA), decentralisation (DV_DECEN) and corporatisation (DG_CORPT). 
An additional variable m easures w hether governance reform took place in 2000
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or later (DG_REFYR). The ‘corporate governance’ (CG) variables m easure the 
existence and nature of the port authority’s objectives and m ission statem ent 
(CG_OBJEC, CG_PROFI, CG_VALUE and CG_MISSI), competences and composi­
tion of supervisory boards (CG_CEOAP, CG_BORPO, CG_BORSZ), use of public 
selection procedures to contract land out (CG_SELEC), existence of CSR policy 
(CG_CSRPO) and accounting practices (CG_ACSEP, CG_ACAUD, CG_ACPUB, 
CG_ACANL). The ‘operational’ (OP) variables identify whether the port authority 
directly or indirectly provides operational services, including technical-nautical 
services (OP_TECNA), ancillary services (OP_ANCIL), cargo-handling services 
(OP_CARHA), passenger-handling services (OP_PAXHA) and transport services 
(OP_TRANS). The ‘functional autonomy’ (FA) variables measure to what extent 
the port authority can autonomously take management decisions as regulator 
(FA_ENTIT, FA_HMAST and FA_POUC) and landlord (FA_LANDO, FA_LANDP, 
FA_LANDD). The ‘functional pro-activeness’ variables are split between those that 
cover the port authority’s own port(s) (PO) and those that go beyond its own 
port(s) (PB). The first group measures the degree in which the port authority 
assumes a facilitating or entrepreneurial attitude in its different functions within 
the area of the port(s) it has directly under its supervision. This relates to its 
function as landlord (PO_CLAUS, PO_URBAN) and regulator (PO_ENVIR, PO_ 
RULES, PCLSUSTA), as well as the economic (PO_BOTTL, POJMPLE, POJTSYS, 
PO_PROMO, PO_TRAIN) and societal (PO_SOCIE) dimension of its community 
manager function. The second group measures to what extent the port authority is 
active beyond the port(s) it has directly under its supervision, in terms of relations 
with other ports (PB_STRAP, PB_DINVE), export of regulatory expertise (PB_ 
REGEX), provision of operational services (PB_SERVI), investment in hinterland 
networks (PB_HINTE) and provision of training (PB_TRAIN). The ‘investment’ 
(IR) variables look at the extent to which the port authority bears investment 
responsibility for the main capital assets that constitute the port (IR_CAPAS) and 
looks at its main sources of income (IR_INCOM, IR_PDUES, IR_LEASE, IR_SERVI, 
IR_PUBFU). The last category seeks to measure the financial autonomy (FI) of port 
authorities through analysis of general port dues (FI_PRICE, FI_NEGOT, FI_PROMO, 
FLCROSS, FLLEVEL, FI_COLLE, FI_BENEF) and other variables (FI_WAGES, 
FLRESUL, FLTARGT).
Table 2 contains a full description of all variables, including the regional 
dum m y variables that are explained in the following subsection.
Introduction of regional dummy variables
As an interm ediate step, we added five dum m y variables, in  order to test the 
hypothesis that the region w here the port authority is located determ ines the 
governance diversity of European port authorities. These dum m y variables
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Table 2: Port governance variables
Code Description Category Type
SZ_ CARGO Total volume of goods handled by th e  ports m anaged by th e  port authority , in 2009, in to n s Size Continuous
sz_CONTR Total volume of containers handled by th e  ports  m anaged by th e  port au thority , in 2009, in to n s Size Continuous
sz_.PASSG Total num ber o f  passen g ers  h and led  by th e  p o rts  m anaged by th e  p o rt au th o rity , in 2009 Size Continuous
sz_STAFF Total s ta f f  em ployed  by th e  p o rt a u th o rity , in FTE Size Continuous
RG._HANSE Port a u th o r ity  is Located in th e  Flanse region Region Categorical
RG._NWHAN Port a u th o r ity  is Located in th e  New Flanse reg ion Region Categorical
RG._ANGL0 Port a u th o r ity  is Located in th e  A nglo-Saxon region Region Categorical
RG._LATIN Port a u th o r ity  is Located in th e  Latin region Region Categorical
RG._NWLAT Port a u th o r ity  is Located in th e  New Latin region Region Categorical
DV..PRIVA Port a u th o r ity  is p redom inan tly  privately  ow ned Devolution Categorical
DV._DECEN Port a u th o r ity  is p redom inan tly  ow ned a t  Local Level Devolution Categorical
DV._C0RPT Port a u th o r ity  has c o rp o ra tised  form Devolution Categorical
DV._REFYR G overnance reform  to o k  place in  2000 o r Later Devolution Categorical
CG_.OBJ EC Port a u th o r ity  has g en e ra l form al o b jec tiv es C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.PROFI Econom ic o b jec tiv e  p o rt a u th o r ity  is m ax im isation  o f  own p ro fit C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.VALUE Econom ic o b jec tiv e  p o rt a u th o r ity  is m ax im isation  o f  added  value C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.MISSI Port a u th o r ity  has a m ission s ta te m e n t C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.CEOAP Supervisory body p o rt a u th o r ity  has  end  resp o n sib ility  to  a p p o in t  CEO C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.BORPO Supervisory body p o rt a u th o r ity  has  s ig n if ic a n t num ber o f  e le c ted  po litic ian s C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.BORSZ Num ber o f m em bers in th e  superv isory  body o f  th e  p o r t au th o rity C orporate governance Continuous
CG_.SELEC Port a u th o r ity  uses public  se le c tio n  p rocedure to  co n tra c t Land o u t C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.CSRPO Port a u th o r ity  has a CSR policy C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.ACSEP Port a u th o r ity  m ain ta in s  se p ara te  f in an c ia l a cco u n ts C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.ACAUD Port a u th o r ity  has i ts  f in an c ia l acco u n ts  a u d ite d  by an ex te rn a l a u d ito r C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.ACPUB Port a u th o r ity  pub lish es  its  f in an c ia l acco u n ts C orporate governance Categorical
CG_.ACANL Port a u th o r ity  has an  in te rn a l  an a ly tic a l a c co u n tin g  process C orporate governance Categorical
OP._TECNA Port a u th o r ity  provides te c h n ic a l-n a u tic a l  serv ices O pera tiona l profile Categorical
OP._ANCIL Port a u th o r ity  provides ancillary  serv ices O pera tiona l profile Categorical
OP._CARHA Port a u th o r ity  provides carg o -h an d lin g  services O pera tiona l profile Categorical
OP._PAXHA Port a u th o r ity  provides p assen g er-h an d lin g  serv ices O pera tiona l profile Categorical
OP._TRANS Port a u th o r ity  provides tra n s p o r t  services O pera tiona l profile Categorical
FA_.ENTIT Port a u th o r ity  is th e  only e n ti ty  w ith s ta tu to ry  resp o n sib ilitie s  fo r th e  p o rt(s) i t  m anages F unctional au to n o m y Categorical
FA_.HMAST Flarbour m aste r  is fully in te g ra te d  in th e  p o rt au th o rity F unctional au to n o m y Categorical
FA_.POLIC Port a u th o r ity  em ploys its  own police force F unctional au to n o m y Categorical
FA_.LANDO Port a u th o r ity  is th e  m ain ow ner o f p o rt Land F unctional au to n o m y Categorical
FA_.LANDS Port a u th o r ity  is ab le  to  se ll p o rt Land F unctional au to n o m y Categorical
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Table 2 co n tin u ed
Code Description Category Type
FA._LANDP C ontracting  o f  p o rt Land to  th ird  p a rties  is governed  by p riva te  Law F unctional au tonom y Categorical
FA._LANDD Port a u th o r ity  is  free to  s e t  d u ra tio n s  o f Land use co n trac ts F unctional au tonom y Categorical
PO _CLAUS Port a u th o r ity  ac tive ly  uses perform ance clauses in  te rm in a l a g reem en ts F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _URBAN Port a u th o r ity  e n g a g es  in urban real e s ta te  m an ag em en t F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _ENVIR Port a u th o r ity  e n g a g es  in en v iro n m en ta l Land m an ag em en t F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _RULES Port a u th o r ity  s e ts  own reg u la tio n s  t h a t  go beyond Legal requ irem en ts F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _SUSTA Port a u th o r ity  g enerally  goes beyond Legal req u irem en ts  in ac tio n s  to  e n h a n ce  su s ta in ab ility F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _B0TTL Port a u th o r ity  is  Leader in so lv ing  various ty p es  o f b o ttlen eck s F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO .IMPLE Port a u th o r ity  a s s is ts  and  fac ilita te s  p o rt com m unity  w ith  im p lem en ta tio n  o f reg u la tio n s F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _ITSYS Port a u th o r ity  runs IT system  for th e  e n tire  p o rt com m unity F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _PROMO Port a u th o r ity  Leads th e  overa ll p rom otion  and  m arketing  o f  th e  p ort F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _TRAIN Port a u th o r ity  provides t ra in in g /e d u c a tio n a l  program m es for th e  p o r t com m unity F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PO _S0CIE Port a u th o r ity  is  Leader in various so c ie ta l in te g ra tio n  in itia tiv e s F unctional p ro -ac tiv en ess Categorical
PB _STRAP Port a u th o r ity  has  s tra te g ic  p a rtn e rsh ip s  w ith  o th e r  po rts F p ro -a c t beyond own p o rt Categorical
PB _DINVE Port a u th o r ity  has  d ire c t in v es tm e n ts  in o th e r  ports F p ro -a c t beyond own p o rt Categorical
PB _REGEX Port a u th o r ity  e x p o rts  regu la to ry  ex p e rtise  to  o th e r  ports F p ro -a c t beyond own p o rt Categorical
PB _SERVI Port a u th o r ity  provides o p e ra tio n a l se rv ices in o th e r  po rts F p ro -a c t beyond own p o rt Categorical
PB _HINTE Port a u th o r ity  in v es ts  in h in te rla n d  netw orks o u ts id e  own p ort F p ro -a c t beyond own p o rt Categorical
PB _TRAIN Port a u th o r ity  process t ra in in g /e d u c a tio n a l  program m es o u tsid e  its  own p ort F p ro -a c t beyond own p o rt Categorical
IR_.CAPAS Degree o f  in v es tm e n t resp o n sib ility  p o rt a u th o r ity  for th e  m ain c a p ita l a sse ts  t h a t  c o n s ti tu te  th e  p o rt In v es tm e n t C ontinuous
IR_.INCOM Total o p e ra tio n a l incom e o f  th e  p o rt a u th o rity , in 2009, in Euro In v es tm e n t C ontinuous
IR_.PDUES G eneral p o rt dues form  h ig h es t p e rcen tag e  o f incom e In v es tm e n t Categorical
IR_.LEASE Land Lease form s h ig h es t p e rcen tag e  o f incom e In v es tm e n t Categorical
IR_.SERVI Services form h ig h es t p e rcen tag e  o f incom e In v es tm e n t Categorical
IR_.PUBFU Public fu n d in g  form s h ig h es t p e rcen tag e  o f incom e In v es tm e n t Categorical
FI_ PRICE G eneral p o rt dues are  com m ercial prices F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ NEGOT G eneral p o rt dues are  n eg o tiab le F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ PROMO Port a u th o r ity  can give com m ercial p rom o tio n s  on g en e ra l p o rt dues F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ CROSS Port a u th o r ity  can c ross-subsid ies be tw een  d iffe re n t sources o f  incom e Financial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ LEVEL Port a u th o r ity  au to n o m o u sly  s e ts  th e  Level o f g en e ra l p o rt dues F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ COLLE Port a u th o r ity  au to n o m o u sly  co llec ts  g en e ra l p o rt dues F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ BENEF Port a u th o r ity  is  f in a l benefic iary  o f g en e ra l p o rt dues F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ IN VES Port a u th o r ity  au to n o m o u sly  dec ides on  p o r t in v es tm en ts F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ WAGES Port a u th o r ity  s e ts  w ages, te rm s  an d  co n d itio n s  o f serv ice  o f its  own p erso n n el F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ RESUL Port a u th o r ity  d ec id es  au to n o m o u sly  how to  a llo c a te  th e  a n n u a l f in an c ia l resu lt F inancial au tonom y Categorical
FI_ TARGT Port a u th o r ity  does n o t  have to  m ee t c e rta in  f in an c ia l ta rg e ts F inancial au tonom y Categorical
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were based on the geographical typology that was developed by Suykens 
(Suykens, 1988; Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998). His typology, however, 
does not take into account the fall of the iron curtain, which has brought a 
num ber of new ports around the Baltic Sea, the M editerranean and the Black 
Sea in  the competitive arena. These were under planned econom y regimes for 
alm ost 50 years and underw ent varied liberalisation processes after the political 
changeover. These ports can be brought together in  two additional regions: 
‘New H anse’, consisting of countries around the Baltic Sea; and ‘New Latin’, 
consisting of countries in the East M editerranean and the Black Sea.
In this way, we can classify the port authorities in five regional groups:
•  H anse (RG_HANSE): Belgium, D enm ark, F inland, Germ any, Iceland, the 
N etherlands, N orw ay and  Sweden.
•  New Hanse (RG_NWHAN): Estonia, Latvia, L ithuania and Poland.
•  Anglo-Saxon (RG_ANGLO): Ireland and the United Kingdom.
•  Latin (RG_LATIN): Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Portugal and 
Spain.
•  New Latin (RG_NWLAT): Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia.
Most port authorities participating in  the survey are either to be found in 
the Hanse (38 per cent) or Latin (35 per cent) region; third comes the Anglo- 
Saxon region (14 per cent). The two ‘new ’ regions contain relatively few port 
authorities (New Hanse 7 per cent and New Latin 6 per cent).
Factor analysis
After cleaning up the results of the survey and adding the regional dummy 
variables, the database still contained 72 variables. Applying a data reduction 
technique m ay therefore help to reveal the relations betw een governance 
practices of port authorities in Europe and explain port governance diversity. 
Factor analysis is commonly applied to explore data sets w ith m any variables, 
w hich are then  sum m arised into a lim ited num ber of unobserved factors. Doing 
this, the analysis tries to keep the num ber of factors as low as possible while 
m aintaining a m axim um  of the inform ation, which is present in the original 
data. For each factor, the factor loadings indicate to which extent they are corre­
lated with each variable. If the factor loadings of two variables show similarities, 
these variables are related. On the basis of the resulting pattern, factors are often 
labelled and accordingly, clusters of observations can be detected (Stevens, 2002).
Two problems rem ain w hen analysing the ESPO database. First, a con­
siderable am ount of observations has missing values for one or m ore variables. 
Second, m ost variables are categorical in nature. Classical factor analysis,
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however, assum es continuous and norm ally distributed variables. Among 
others, N isenbaum  et al (2004) and Vanoutrive et al (2010) applied binary 
(categorical) factor analysis to get insight in  questionnaires containing an 
extensive list of binary yes/no questions. The software employed in these studies, 
Mplus (Muthén and Muthén, 2006), allows one to carry out factor analyses with a 
mix of both continuous and categorical variables. Furthermore, this package can 
handle missing data without omitting valuable information, as is the case with 
standard list-wise or pair-wise deleting options in other software.
Although the chosen technique can handle missing data, we deleted 6 from 
the 116 observations because these six port authorities did not provide data on 
m ore than  40 per cent of the variables. Furthermore, the categorical variables 
were re-coded in  binary variables as this did not bring along an im portant loss 
of inform ation, that is, some rare categories would not positively contribute to 
an analysis of the m ain patterns present in the data. Finally, we attributed the 
label ‘m issing’ for the cargo variable instead of a value of zero to ports, which 
do not handle any cargo at all. Given the limited num ber of ports w ith only 
passenger traffic, we do not expect that this affects the results in a m ajor way.
We estimate two models, one w ith and one w ithout the regional dum m y 
variables. These variables have a value of one if the port belongs to the Hanse, 
New Hanse, Anglo-Saxon, Latin or New Latin region, respectively, and a value 
of zero if not. As these dum m y variables are m utually exclusive, and to avoid 
that this pre-specified clustering influences the results and their interpretation, 
we will first look at the model w ithout these regional variables and use the 
model w ith the regional variables to check our findings.
R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  F a c t o r  A n a l y s i s
Number of factors and factor loadings
As in standard factor analysis, the eigenvalues are used to select the num ber of 
factors. Figure 2 pictures the scree plot w hich shows the eigenvalues. The twists 
in a scree plot indicate possible values for the num ber of factors.
The second criterion, taking the same num ber of factors as there are 
eigenvalues larger than  one, could not be applied as this would imply a large 
num ber of factors. The scree plot suggests a model w ith four or five factors. 
After an exam ination of both models, we prefer a model w ith four factors as the 
results were easier to interpret than  those of the five-factor model. The results 
(Varimax rotated) are given in Table 3. Factor loadings ^ 0 .4  are show n in bold 
as these are considered meaningful. Note that values ^ 0 .3  are also large en­
ough to be im portant.
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Figure 2: S cree  p lo t  o f  th e  m ode ls  w ith  an d  w ith o u t  re g io n a l dum m y v a riab le s .
Note that the presence of missing and binary data and the relatively limited 
num ber of observations, together w ith a rather large num ber of variables, can 
explain the low values of test statistics indicated at the bottom  of Table 3. In 
addition to the fact that the first 23 eigenvalues stay above 1, also the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) stays above 0.1 even for a model with 
ten factors, while a m oderately well-fitting model has an RMSEA <0.10 (Gilbert 
and Meijer, 2006) or even RMSEA <0.08  (Stevens, 2002, p. 433) (numbers for 
the model w ithout regional dum m y variables). Although fit statistics suggest 
that the model does not perform well, many factor loadings have values ^ 0 .4  and 
we could detect patterns that correspond with the literature. As a consequence, we 
did not try to improve the model by omitting variables as this would imply a 
loss of information.
In general, the results of the models w ith and w ithout region dummy 
variables are similar, which is a first indication that this clustering of ports in 
regions could also reflect differences in governance practices. This will be ex­
plored further in  the next section, which discusses the results. Table 4 already 
m arks the correspondence betw een the factors in both models.
Description of the factors
In this section, we describe the four factors individually, looking first at the 
factor in  the model w ithout region dum m y variables and then comparing it with
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Table 3 : F ac to r lo a d in g s  o f  th e  4 - fa c to r  m o d e ls  w ith o u t  reg ion  dum m y v a ria b le s  ( le f t)  an d  w ith  reg ion  dum m y v a ria b le s  ( r ig h t)
Variable Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
SZ_CARG0 0 .1 4 0.54 0.21 0.13 0.11 - 0 .0 4 0.10 0.53
SZ_PASSG - 0 .0 3 - 0 .0 1 0.15 - 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 1 0 .1 4 0 .04 0 .05
SZ_STAFF - 0 .0 4 0.57 0.11 0.40 0 .06 0 .10 - 0 .2 6 0.65
IR_CAPAS 0 .12 0 .02 - 0 .2 7 0 .20 0 .22 - 0 .1 2 - 0 .3 2 0 .0 4
IR_INC0M 0.13 0.80 0.37 - 0 .1 2 0 .08 - 0 .0 2 0.32 0.80
CG_B0RSZ 0.71 - 0 .0 6 0.02 - 0 .2 0 0.64 - 0 .2 4 0.35 - 0 .1 3
RG_HANSE — — — — -0.82 - 0 .1 0 0.42 - 0 .1 0
RG_NWHAN — — — — - 0 .0 2 0 .30 - 0 .1 6 0 .00
RG_ANGL0 — — — — - 0 .1 8 - 0 .2 4 -0.88 - 0 .2 8
RG_LATIN — — — — 0.95 - 0 .1 4 0.21 0 .15
RG_NWLAT — — — — 0 .26 0.67 - 0 .1 5 0.03
DV_PRIVA 0.23 0.31 0.45 0.93 0 .00 0.01 -0.92 - 0 .2 7
DV_DECEN -0.71 - 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .2 3 -0.84 - 0 .1 3 0.17 - 0 .1 8
DV_C0RPT - 0 .3 9 0 .21 - 0 .2 4 0.42 - 0 .2 7 0 .08 -0.56 0 .30
DV_REFYR -0.52 0 .04 0.38 0.01 -0.54 0 .32 0.20 0 .10
CG_0BJ EC 0.43 0 .21 0.40 - 0 .1 8 0 .38 0 .19 0.39 0 .26
CG_PR0FI -0.48 - 0 .0 1 - 0 .2 6 0.41 - 0 .2 9 - 0 .0 1 -0.66 0 .0 4
CG_VALUE - 0 .1 1 0 .36 - 0 .1 9 - 0 .2 4 - 0 .2 4 - 0 .3 8 0.25 0.23
CG_MISSI 0 .09 0.41 - 0 .0 4 -0.42 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .2 2 0.25 0.33
CG_CE0AP -0.58 0 .22 - 0 .0 9 - 0 .2 7 -0.63 - 0 .1 1 - 0 .0 1 0 .16
CG_B0RP0 -0.49 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .2 2 -0.58 -0.71 - 0 .3 0 0.42 - 0 .2 5
CG_SELEC 0.54 0.46 0.19 - 0 .1 0 0.55 0 .05 0.17 0.53
CG_CSRP0 0 .30 0.49 - 0 .3 7 0 .19 0.31 -0.41 - 0 .1 8 0.42
CG_ACSEP - 0 .2 2 0.74 0.37 0 .02 - 0 .2 1 0 .19 0.13 0.81
CG_ACAUD -0.48 0.86 - 0 .0 2 0.03 -0.45 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .1 7 0.88
CG_ACPUB - 0 .1 1 0.53 - 0 .5 6 0.03 - 0 .1 2 -0.68 - 0 .2 2 0 .37
CG_ACANL 0 .18 0.51 0.10 0.33 0 .22 - 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 4 0.52
0P_TECNA - 0 .3 3 - 0 .0 9 -0.73 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .3 1 -0.51 -0.49 - 0 .1 9
0P_ANCIL - 0 .3 7 0.05 -0.68 - 0 .2 6 -0.44 -0.65 - 0 .1 4 - 0 .1 2
0P_CARHA - 0 .3 4 - 0 .2 3 -0.55 0 .39 - 0 .1 9 - 0 .1 5 -0.68 - 0 .2 0
0P_PAXHA 0.11 0 .0 4 -0.49 0 .02 0 .1 4 - 0 .3 7 - 0 .2 1 - 0 .0 2
0P_TRANS 0 .35 - 0 .3 1 -0.41 0 .07 0 .32 - 0 .2 8 - 0 .1 3 - 0 .3 8
FA_ENTIT -0.42 - 0 .0 9 - 0 .2 1 - 0 .4 0 -0.48 - 0 .2 3 0.02 - 0 .1 9
FA_HMAST -0.73 0 .04 - 0 .2 5 - 0 .1 5 -0.76 - 0 .2 9 - 0 .1 8 - 0 .0 7
FA_P0LIC 0.45 0 .24 - 0 .2 2 - 0 .0 5 0.47 - 0 .3 4 - 0 .0 7 0 .18
FA_LAND0 -0.55 - 0 .0 6 - 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 3 -0.53 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .1 8 - 0 .1 0
FA_LANDS -0.48 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .1 1 - 0 .0 6 -0.48 - 0 .1 8 - 0 .1 5 - 0 .1 3
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FA_LANDP -0.58 0.13 0.16 0.11 -0.58 0 .17 - 0 .0 9 0 .15
FA_LANDD - 0 .2 3 - 0 .3 2 - 0 .0 7 0 .07 - 0 .1 9 0 .02 - 0 .2 4 - 0 .3 3
P0_CLAUS 0.45 0.30 - 0 .1 8 0 .05 0.40 - 0 .2 4 0.06 0 .26
POJJRBAN 0.61 0.08 - 0 .2 0 - 0 .1 9 0.58 - 0 .2 9 0.10 0 .0 4
P0_ENVIR 0.23 0 .26 0.09 - 0 .0 3 0.23 0 .06 0.05 0 .29
P0_RULES - 0 .0 7 0 .33 - 0 .2 9 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .1 1 -0.42 - 0 .0 3 0 .20
P0_SUSTA 0.40 0.28 - 0 .3 2 - 0 .0 7 0 .3 4 -0.51 0.09 0 .1 4
P0_B0TTL 0 .3 4 0 .18 -0.50 0 .20 0 .37 -0.51 - 0 .2 7 0 .07
POJMPLE 0 .30 0 .26 - 0 .1 3 - 0 .1 6 0.23 - 0 .2 3 0.09 0 .20
P0_ITSYS 0 .25 0.54 - 0 .2 5 - 0 . 1 0 .22 - 0 .2 5 0.01 0.52
P0_PR0M 0 0 .10 0 .06 - 0 .3 6 - 0 .1 2 0 .07 - 0 .2 5 - 0 .0 6 0.01
P0_TRAIN 0.42 0.11 - 0 .2 3 - 0 .0 4 0 .37 - 0 .3 7 0.02 0 .00
P0_S0CIE 0.33 0.43 - 0 .2 9 - 0 .2 8 0 .19 -0.57 0.27 0 .27
PB_STRAP 0.78 0.20 - 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 8 0.64 - 0 .2 9 0.37 0 .12
PB_DINVE 0.44 0 .29 - 0 .0 8 0 .00 0 .36 - 0 .2 3 0.19 0.23
PB_REGEX 0.41 0.66 - 0 .1 2 0 .02 0.33 -0.43 0.16 0.54
PB_SERVI 0 .06 - 0 .1 7 -0.45 0.03 0 .02 - 0 .2 4 - 0 .1 6 - 0 .2 1
PB_HINTE 0.63 0 .32 - 0 .0 7 0 .19 0.60 - 0 .1 6 0.05 0.31
PB_TRAIN 0.52 0.43 - 0 .1 9 - 0 .0 2 0.47 - 0 .4 2 0.11 0.33
IR_PDUES - 0 .2 3 - 0 .3 3 0.01 - 0 . 3 - 0 .2 4 0 .08 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .3 1
IR_LEASE 0 .22 0.44 - 0 .1 3 - 0 .2 3 0 .08 - 0 .3 6 0 .34 0 .32
IR_SERVI - 0 .0 9 0 .07 - 0 .0 5 0.80 0.13 0 .22 -0.54 0 .17
IR_PUBFU 0 .30 -0.47 0.11 0 .17 0 .3 4 0.23 - 0 .0 2 -0.44
FI_PRICE -0.64 0.12 - 0 .3 4 0.21 -0.58 - 0 .2 8 -0.48 0 .07
FI_PR0M0 0 .05 0 .10 0.05 -0.44 - 0 .0 6 - 0 .1 5 0.35 0 .02
FI_CR0SS - 0 .1 3 0 .07 -0.40 - 0 .3 0 - 0 .2 1 -0.44 0.01 - 0 .0 4
FI_LEVEL -0.82 0.00 - 0 .1 1 - 0 .1 7 -0.79 0 .0 4 - 0 .2 2 0 .00
FI_C0LLE -0.61 0.27 -0.43 - 0 .3 8 -0.68 -0.40 - 0 .0 7 0 .18
FI_BENEF - 0 .3 5 - 0 .0 2 0.03 -0.48 - 0 .3 8 - 0 .0 5 0.18 - 0 .0 1
FIJNVES - 0 .3 1 - 0 .1 1 -0.47 0 .14 - 0 .2 3 - 0 .2 2 -0.54 - 0 .1 4
FI_WAGES -0.59 - 0 .1 6 0.00 - 0 .0 6 -0.56 0 .18 - 0 .2 1 - 0 .1 2
FI_RESUL - 0 .1 1 - 0 .0 8 - 0 .3 0 0 .10 - 0 .0 5 - 0 .1 5 - 0 .3 6 - 0 .1 0
FI_TARGT - 0 .0 8 - 0 .1 2 0.46 0.13 - 0 .0 1 0.49 0.05 0 .00
Notes: fa c to r  Loadings a re  Varimax ro ta te d ; va lues  > 0 .4  in  bo ld ; RMSEA m odel w ith o u t reg ion  dum m y v ariab les  (Left): 0 .1 5 5 ; RMSEA m ode l w ith  reg ion  dum m y 
v ariab les  (r ig h t) : 0 .1 6 2 .
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Table 4: C o rresp o n d en ce  b e tw e e n  fa c to rs  in m o d e ls  w ith  an d  w ith o u t  dum m y v a riab le s
Model w itho u t dummy variables Relationship Model w ith  dummy variables
F ac to r 1 + F ac to r 1
F ac to r 2 + F ac to r 4
F ac to r 3 + F ac to r 2
F ac to r 4 - F ac to r 3
the corresponding factor in the model w ith the dum m y variables. For each 
factor, loadings higher than  0.3 are represented in individual tables. In each 
table, variables w ith an  estim ated residual variance lower or equal to 0.5 are 
highlighted in  bold. Estimated residual variances indicate how  m uch of each 
variable is explained through the entire model, that is, comprising all factors. 
The annex gives the estim ated residual variances for all variables.
Factor 1 : Latin -  Hanseatic contrasts in autonom y and pro-activeness 
Table 5 illustrates that Factor 1 is generally characterised by positive loadings for 
variables that relate to functional pro-activeness, both within (PO) and beyond 
(PB) the own port. Negative loadings exist for variables that relate to financial (FI) 
and functional autonomy (FA), as well as devolution (DV). Variables on corporate 
governance (CG) demonstrate a mixed picture. Positive loading exists for the size 
of the supervisory boards (CG_BORSZ), but a negative one on politicians being 
significantly present in them (CG_BORPO). Negative loadings exist on profit 
maximisation as the main economic objective (CG_PROFI) and the external audit 
of financial accounts (CG_ACAUD). A positive loading appears for the use of public 
selection procedures to land contracts (CG_SELEC). Although the factor loadings 
are not high for operational variables (OP), they are generally negative (except for 
transport services (OP_TRANS)).
In summary, we could say that, som ehow paradoxically, Factor 1 m atches 
lim ited autonom y with a substantial degree of pro-activeness. If we compare 
this picture w ith the model that has regional variables included, we find that 
Factor 1 has a strongly positive loading for the Latin region (RG_LATIN) and a 
strongly negative one for the Hanse region (RG_HANSE).
Factor 2: Large corporately governed port authorities
Table 6 shows that Factor 2 has positive loadings for size-related variables 
(income (IR_INCOM), num ber of staff (SZ_STAFF) and volume of cargo 
(SZ_CARGO)). Positive loadings also exist for transparency-related variables in 
the category of corporate governance (for example, w here it concerns financial 
accounts (CG_ACSEP, CG_ACAUD, CG_ACPUB) and the use of public selection
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Table 5 : L oad ings  F ac to r 1 (w ith  an d  w ith o u t  dum m y v a riab le s )
Model w itho u t region dummy variables (Factor 1 )
P o sitiv e  f a c to r  > 0 .7  PB_STRAP, CG_B0RSZ
lo a d in g  > 0 . 6  PB_HINTE, POJJRBAN
> 0 . 5  CG_SELEC, PB_TRAIN
> 0 . 4  FA_P0LIC, P0_CLAUS, PB_DINVE, CGJJBJEC, P0_TRAIN, PB_REGEX,
P0_SUSTA
> 0 .3  0P_TRANS, P0_B0TTL, P0_S0CIE
N eg a tiv e  fa c to r  < —0 .8  FI_LEVEL
lo a d in g  < - 0 . 7  FA_HMAST, DV_DECEN
< - 0 . 6  FI_PRICE, FLC0LLE
< - 0 . 5  FI_WAGES, CG_CE0AP, FA_LANDP, FA_LAND0, DV_REFYR
< - 0 . 4  CG_B0RP0, FA_LANDS, CG_PR0FI, CG_ACAUD, FA_ENTIT
< - 0 . 3  DV_C0RPT, 0P_ANCIL, FI_BENEF, 0P_CARHA, 0P_TECNA, F I J N  VES
Model w ith  region dummy variables (Factor 1)
P o sitiv e  f a c to r  > 0 . 8  RG_LATIN
lo a d in g  > 0 . 6  CG_B0RSZ, PB_STRAP, PB_HINTE
> 0 . 5  POJJRBA N, CG_SELEC
> 0 . 4  FA_P0LIC, PBJRAIN
> 0 .3  P 0 JL A U S , CGJJBJEC, P 0 J R A IN , P0_B0TTL, PB_DINVE, P0_SUSTA,
IR_PUBFU, PB_REGEX, 0 P JR A N S , C G JS R P 0  
N eg a tiv e  fa c to r  < - 0 . 8  RG_HANSE, DV_DECEN
lo a d in g  < - 0 . 7  FIJEVEL, FA_HMAST, CG_B0RP0
< - 0 . 6  FI_C0LLE, C G JE 0A P
< - 0 . 5  FI_PRICE, F A JA N  DP, FIJVAGES, DV_REFYR, FAJA ND O
< - 0 . 4  F A JN T IT , FA JA N D S, CG_ACAUD, 0P_ANCIL
< - 0 . 3  FI_BENEF, 0PJECNA
Note: V ariables w ith  an e s tim a te d  res id u a l v a rian ce  < 0 .5 0  are  in d ic a te d  in  bold.
procedures for contracting out land to third parties (CGJ3ELEC)). It furtherm ore 
has positive loadings on functional pro-activeness, both w ithin (PO) and 
beyond the ow n port (PB). W ithin the investm ent category, a positive loading is 
present for land lease being the highest percentage of operational income 
(IR_LEASE) and a negative one for public funding being the highest percentage 
(IR_PUBFU). A negative loading also appears for private ownership of the port 
authority (DV_PRIVA).
In summary, Factor 2 combines the size of the port authority w ith principles 
of good corporate governance and functional pro-activeness. Compared with 
the corresponding Factor 4 in the model w ith regional dum m y variables, we 
notice that these do not appear in  the list of significant variables. The regional 
adherence does not therefore play a role.
Factor 3 : New European public conservators
It appears from Table 7 that Factor 3 shows predominantly negative loadings, 
especially for variables that relate to operational involvement in port services (OP),
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Table 6: L oad ings: F ac to r 2 ( w ith o u t dum m y v a r iab le s )  an d  F ac to r 4  (w ith  dum m y v a riab le s )
Model w itho u t region dummy variables (Factor 2 )
P o sitiv e  f a c to r > 0 .8 CG_ACAUD, IRJNC0M
lo a d in g > 0 .7 CG_ACSEP
> 0 .6 PB REGEX
> 0 .5 SZ STAFF, P0 ITSYS, SZ CARGO, CG ACPUB, CG ACANL
> 0 . 4 CG_CSRP0, CG_SELEC, IR_LEASE, P0_S0C IE , PB_TRAIN, CG_MISSI
> 0 .3 CG VALUE, P0 RULES, PB HINTE
N egative  fa c to r < - 0 . 4 IR_PUBFU
lo a d in g
0*1OV IR_PDUES, FA_LANDD, 0P_TRANS, DV_PRIVA
Model w ith  region dum m y variables (Factor 4)
P o sitiv e  f a c to r > 0 .8 CG_ACAUD, CG_ACSEP, IRJNC0M
lo a d in g > 0 .6 SZ_STAFF
> 0 .5 PB REGEX, CG SELEC, SZ CARGO, PO ITSYS, CG ACANL
> 0 . 4 CG CSRPO
> 0 .3 CG_ACPUB, CG_MISSI, PB_TRAIN, IR_LEASE, PB_HINTE, DV_C0RPT
N egative  fa c to r < - 0 . 4 IR_PUBFU
lo a d in g
0*1OV 0P_TRANS, FA_LANDD, IR_PDUES
Note: V ariables w ith  an  e s tim a te d  res id u a l v a rian ce  < 0 .5 0  a re  in d ic a te d  in  bold.
Table 7: L oad ings: F ac to r 3 ( w ith o u t dum m y v a r iab le s )  an d  F ac to r 2 (w ith  dum m y v a riab le s )
Model w itho u t region dummy variables (Factor 3 )
P o sitiv e  f a c to r > 0 . 4 CG_0BJEC,
lo a d in g > 0 .3 DV_REFYR, IRJNC0M, CG_ACSEP
N egative  fa c to r < - 0 . 7 0P_TECNA
lo a d in g < - 0 . 6 OP ANCIL
< - 0 . 5 CG_ACPUB, 0P_CARHA
< - 0 . 4 PO B0TTL, OP PAXHA, FI INVES, FI TARGT, PB SERVI, DV PRIVA, 
FI COLLE, OP TRANS, FI CROSS0*1OV CG CSRPO, PO PROMO, FI PRICE, PO SUSTA, FI RESUL
Model w ith  region dum m y variables (Factor 2 )
P o sitiv e  f a c to r > 0 . 6 RG_NWLAT
lo a d in g > 0 . 4 FI_TARGT
> 0 .3 DV REFYR, RG NWHAN (0 .299)
N egative  fa c to r < - 0 . 6 CG_ACPUB, 0P_ANCIL
lo a d in g < - 0 . 5 P0_S0C IE , P0_SUSTA, 0P_TECNA, P0_B0TTL
< - 0 . 4 FI CROSS, PB REGEX, PO RULES, PB TRAIN, CG CSRPO
< - 0 . 3 FI COLLE, CG VALUE, OP PAXHA, PO TRAIN, IR LEASE, FA POLIC,
CG_B0RP0
Note: V ariables w ith  an  e s tim a te d  res id u a l v a rian ce  < 0 .5 0  a re  in d ic a te d  in  bold.
corporate governance (transparency) (CG), functional pro-activeness w ithin (PO) 
and beyond the port (PB), as well as financial autonomy (FI). A negative loading 
also exists for private ownership of the port authority (DV_PRIVA), whereas 
a positive loading appears for the variable that indicates w hether the port 
authority obtained its present legal form in the last decade (DV_REFYR).
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Factor 3 bears resem blance to the ‘conservator’ type of port authority that 
was identified in Table 1. Compared with the corresponding Factor 2 in  the 
model w ith regional dum m y variables, we see a strong positive loading for the 
New Latin region (RG_NWLAT) and a m odest positive loading for the New 
Hanse region (RG_NWHAN).
Factor 4: Anglo-Saxon private entrepreneurs
Finally, Table 8 shows that Factor 4 has positive loadings for devolution variables 
(DV), most strongly for privatisation (DV_PRIVA). It also has a strongly positive 
loading for the variable that indicates that the provision of services forms the 
highest percentage of income of the port authority (IR_SERVI). This corresponds 
with the positive loading for the variables that indicate that the port 
authority provides cargo-handling services (OP_CARHA) and has maximization of 
its own profit as an economic objective (CG_PROFI). The factor has negative 
loadings on financial autonomy variables (FI). A negative loading appears on 
politicians being significantly present in the supervisory board of the port authority 
(CG_BORPO).
This factor has elements of the entrepreneurial type indicated in Table 1. 
The negative loadings on financial autonom y (FI) seem paradoxical, however. 
Factor 4 relates negatively to Factor 3 in the model w ith regional dummy 
variables. Taking this into account, it is obvious that the Anglo-Saxon regional 
variable (RG_ANGLO) plays a very im portant role.
Table 8: L oad ings: F ac to r 4  ( w ith o u t dum m y v a ria b le s )  an d  F ac to r 3 (w ith  dum m y v a r iab le s )
Model w itho u t region dummy variables (Factor 4 )
P o sitiv e  f a c to r > 0 .9 DV_PRIVA
lo a d in g > 0 . 8 IR SERVI
> 0 . 4 DV C0RPT, CG PR0FI
> 0 .3 SZ_STAFF, 0P_CARHA, CG_ACANL
N eg ativ e  fa c to r < - 0 . 5 CG_B0RP0
lo a d in g < - 0 . 4 FI_BENEF, FI_PR0M 0, CG_MISSI
< - 0 . 3 FA_ENTIT, FI_C0LLE, IR_PDUES, FI_CR0SS
Model w ith  region dummy variables (Factor 3 )
P o sitiv e  f a c to r > 0 . 4 CG_B0RP0, RG_HANSE
lo a d in g > 0 .3 CG_0BJEC, PB_STRAP, FI_PR0M 0, CG_B0RSZ, IR_LEASE, IRJNC0M
N eg ativ e  fa c to r < - 0 . 9 DV_PRIVA
lo a d in g < - 0 . 8 RG ANGLO
< - 0 . 6 0P_CARHA, CG_PR0FI
< - 0 . 5 DV C0RPT, IR SERVI, FI INVES
< - 0 . 4 OP TECNA, FI PRICE
< - 0 . 3 FI RESUL, IR CAPAS
Note: V ariables w ith  an e s tim a te d  res id u a l v a rian ce  < 0 .5 0  are  in d ic a te d  in  bold.
©  2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 Maritime Economics & Logistics Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 199
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  R e s e a r c h  A g e n d a
There exists a wide range of studies, w hich discuss port governance in  general 
or focus on particular aspects. However, up until now, research on port gov­
ernance practices was limited to case studies or rather descriptive analyses. The 
present study extends this research by analysing a large num ber of European 
port authorities (n =  110) in a quantitative manner, using factor analysis. The 
2010 ESPO Fact-Finding Survey proved to be a valuable source of inform ation to 
explore differences in governance practices betw een European ports.
The results confirm the existence of different types of port governance 
in Europe, which to some extent correspond w ith the hypothetical typology 
according to w hich port au thorities can  be conservators, facilitators or 
en trepreneurs. Differences are m ainly geographically defined and the sub­
division in Hanseatic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and new M ember State port autho­
rities proves to be a valuable one. Taking into account that, proportionally, m ost 
port authorities in Europe belong to either the Hanse or Latin tradition, the 
difference betw een them  translates itself in  a N orth-South duality w hich not 
only involves simple ownership differences, but also covers m any other gov­
ernance elements, especially functional and financial autonomy, which is typically 
m ore limited in the south.
In addition to this geographical explanation of diversity, we could also 
detect differences in term s of governance practices betw een small and large 
ports. The latter generally follow a more pro-active approach and score higher 
on transparency-related variables.
The findings of our analysis invite more in-depth research. The principal 
factors should be explored further to explain apparent paradoxes, such as the 
lim ited functional and financial autonom y that Latin port authorities seem to 
combine w ith a pro-active facilitator approach. The same goes for the out­
spoken entrepreneurial profile of Anglo-Saxon port authorities that seems to be 
bound by limited financial autonomy. This in-depth research will be done 
through comparative case study analysis. The m ost pertinent variables can 
furtherm ore be transform ed into perform ance indicators in order to keep track 
of evolutions in port governance practices over time. Finally, the potentially 
harm onising influence of EU law and policy on European port governance 
should be analysed (Verhoeven, 2009).
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A p p e n d i x
Table A: E stim a ted  re s id u a l v a r ian ces
Variable Model w ith o u t region dum m y variables Model w ith  region dummy variables
Estim ated residual variance Estim ated residual variance
SZ CARGO 0 .6 3 0 .7 0
SZ_PASSG 0 .9 7 0 .9 8
SZ STAFF 0 .5 1 0 .5 0
IR_CAPAS 0 .8 7 0 .8 4
IR INCOM 0 .1 9 0 .2 5
CG BORSZ 0 .4 6 0 .4 0
RG_HANSE — 0 .1 4
RG NWHAN — 0 .8 9
RG ANGLO — 0 .0 7
RG_LATIN — 0 .0 1
RG NWLAT — 0 .4 6
DV PRIVA - 0 . 2 0 0 .0 9
DV_DECEN 0 .4 4 0 .2 2
DV CORPT 0 .5 7 0 .5 2
DV REFYR 0 .5 9 0 .5 5
CG_0BJEC 0 .5 8 0 .6 0
CG PROFI 0 .5 3 0 .4 8
CG_VALU E 0 .7 7 0 .6 9
CG MISSI 0 .6 5 0 .7 8
CG CEOAP 0 .5 4 0 .5 7
CG_BORPO 0 .3 6 0 .1 6
CG SELEC 0 .4 6 0 .3 9
CG CSRPO 0 .5 0 0 .5 3
CG_ACSEP 0 .2 8 0 .2 5
CG ACAUD 0 .0 4 - 0 . 0 2
CG ACPUB 0 .4 0 0 .3 4
CG_ACANL 0 .5 9 0 .6 9
OP TECNA 0 .3 5 0 .3 7
OP_ANCIL 0 .3 3 0 .3 5
OP CARHA 0 .3 8 0 .4 3
OP PAXHA 0 .7 5 0 .8 0
OP_TRANS 0 .6 1 0 .6 6
FA ENTIT 0 .6 2 0 .6 8
FA HMAST 0 .3 9 0 .3 0
FA_POLIC 0 .6 9 0 .6 2
FA LANDO 0 .6 8 0 .6 8
FA LANDS 0 .7 5 0 .7 0
FA_LANDP 0 .6 2 0 .6 1
FA LANDD 0 .8 4 0 .8 0
PO CLAUS 0 .6 8 0 .7 2
PO_URBAN 0 .5 5 0 .5 7
PO ENVIR 0 .8 7 0 .8 6
PO_RULES 0 .7 9 0 .7 7
PO SUSTA 0 .6 5 0 .6 0
PO BOTTL 0 .5 7 0 .5 3
PO JM PLE 0 .8 0 0 .8 5
PO ITSYS 0 .5 7 0 .6 2
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T a b le  A continued
Variable Model w ith o u t region dum m y variables Model w ith  region dummy variables
Estim ated residual variance Estim ated residual variance
P0 PROMO 0 .8 5 0 .9 3
P0 TRAIN 0 .7 6 0 .7 3
P0_S0CIE 0 .5 4 0 .4 9
PB STRAP 0 .3 5 0 .3 6
PB DINVE 0 .7 1 0 .7 3
PB_REGEX 0 .3 9 0 .3 9
PB SERVI 0 .7 6 0 .8 8
PB HINTE 0 .4 7 0 .5 1
PB_TRAIN 0 .5 0 0 .4 9
IR PDUES 0 .7 5 0 .8 4
IR_LEASE 0 .6 9 0 .6 4
IR SERVI 0 .3 4 0 .6 1
IR PUBFU 0 .6 5 0 .6 4
FI_PRICE 0 .4 3 0 .3 5
FI PROMO 0 .7 9 0 .8 5
FI CROSS 0 .7 3 0 .7 6
FI_LEVEL 0 .2 9 0 .3 2
FI COLLE 0 .2 2 0 .3 4
FI BENEF 0 .6 5 0 .8 2
F IJN V ES 0 .6 6 0 .5 9
FI WAGES 0 .6 2 0 .6 0
FI RESUL 0 .8 8 0 .8 4
FI TARGT 0 .7 6 0 .7 6
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